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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Virginia legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2016 to July 1, 2017.   
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II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments  
The following is a discussion of notable legislation: 
A. House Bill 2169 
House Bill 2169 (“H.B. 2169”)—An Act to amend and reenact § 58.1–
3713 of the Code of Virginia, relating to local gas severance tax; extension 
of sunset date. 
Generally, Virginia Code § 58.1–3713 authorizes any county or city to 
adopt a license tax on every person engaging in the business of severing 
gases from the earth. Although set to expire in 2018, H.B. 2169 amended 
Virginia Code § 58.1–3713 by extending the sunset date from 2018 to 2020.  
B. Senate Bill 910 
Senate Bill 910 (“S.B. 910”)—An Act to amend and reenact § 45.1–
361.43 and Virginia Code § 45.1–361.44 of the Code of Virginia, relating 
to gas and oil drilling; groundwater.  
Virginia Code § 45.1–361.43 and Virginia Code § 45.1–361.44 HB 910 
grant an oil and gas operator the right to enter upon the surface of a 
property at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to obtain samples 
of water from water wells. Previously, limited to 750 feet surrounding a 
proposed or existing gas well, S.B. 910 amended Virginia Code § 45.1–
361.43 and Virginia Code § 45.1–361.44 by extending this right to an area 
from 750 feet to 1,320 feet.  
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued two opinions addressing the 
application of Virginia Code § 56–49.01, which provides for a means by 
which a company operating as a natural gas company as defined in 15 
U.S.C. § 717a, as amended, can enter onto the premises of a non-consenting 
land owner for the purpose of making examinations, tests, surveys, etc., for 
a proposed pipeline. 
1. Chaffins v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC1 
In Chaffins v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia clarified the notice provision under Virginia Code § 56–49.01(C). 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 293 Va. 564, 801 S.E.2d 189 (2017). 
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a) Facts and Proceedings 
While in the process of constructing a pipeline for the purpose of 
transporting natural gas, the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC sought 
permission from Charles Chaffins, Linda Chaffins, Michael Huntley, and 
Beverly McQuary (collectively, the “Landowners”) to enter onto their 
property to conduct preliminary surveys and studies as required by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.2 The Landowners refused to grant 
their permission, after which Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC relied on 
Virginia Code Section (“V.C.”) § 56–49.01 in order to gain access to the 
premises.3 Pursuant to V.C. § 56–49.01(C), a natural gas company must 
provide notice of their intent to enter the premises, and that notice must “set 
forth the date of the intended entry.”4 Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC 
provided notice to the Landowners, stating therein that entry would occur 
“on or after April 27, 2015.”  
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC filed petitions with the circuit court seeking 
declaratory judgments against the Landowners, seeking an order declaring 
that, pursuant to V.C. § 56–49.01, Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC had the 
right to enter the Landowners’ properties.5 The Landowners argued that the 
notices failed to establish the date of the intended entry required under 
V.C.S. § 56–49.01(C) because the time frame provided in the notice, “on or 
after April 27, 2015,” was too broad.6 On April 13, 2016, the circuit court 
issued a final order entitling Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC  to enter the 
Landowners’ properties pursuant to Code § 56–49.01.7     
b) Ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted appeal and overruled the 
decision of the Circuit Court, holding that Virginia Code § 56–
49.01(C) “requires that a notice of intent to enter provide dates certain upon 
which entry is intended.”8 Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC’s “on or after 
notices failed to do this.”9 The Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that  
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 566-67.  
 3. Id. 
 4. VA. CODE ANN. § 56–49.01(C) (West 2017). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 570.  
 9. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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[w]hile in some cases the above interpretation of Code § 56–
49.01(C) may require [Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC] to reissue a 
notice of intent to enter, this does not render the statute internally 
inconsistent or incapable of operation. It would be, at most, 
inconvenient or logistically difficult for [Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
LLC]. However, the General Assembly has determined that such 
difficulties are necessary in exchange for the privilege of 
entering private property without the owner’s permission.10 
2. Palmer v.  Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC11 
In Palmer v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia clarified the residency requirements under Virginia Code § 56–
49.01(A) and affirmed its constitutionality.     
a) Facts and Proceedings 
While constructing a pipeline for the purpose of transporting natural gas, 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC sought permission from Hazel Palmer 
(“Landowner”) to enter onto her property to conduct preliminary surveys 
and studies as required by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.12 
Landowner refused to grant permission to access her property, and Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline, LLC provided notice of their intent to enter onto her 
property under Virginia Code Section (“V.C.”) § 56–49.01.13 Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline, LLC petitioned the circuit court for a declaratory judgment 
requesting a declaration of its rights under Virginia Code § 56–49.01.14  
V.C. § 56–49.01(A) provides that:  
Any firm, corporation, company, or partnership, organized for 
the bona fide purpose of operating as a natural gas company as 
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 717a, as amended, may make such 
examinations, tests, hand auger borings, appraisals, and surveys 
for its proposed line or location of its works as are necessary (i) 
to satisfy any regulatory requirements and (ii) for the selection of 
the most advantageous location or route, the improvement or 
straightening of its line or works, changes of location or 
construction, or providing additional facilities, and for such 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 570. 
 11. 293 Va. 573, 801 S.E.2d 414 (2017). 
 12. Id. at 576.  
 13. Id. at 577.  
 14. Id.  
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purposes, by its duly authorized officers, agents, or employees, 
may enter upon any property without the written permission of 
its owner if (a) the natural gas company has requested the 
owner’s permission to inspect the property as provided in 
subsection B, (b) the owner’s written permission is not received 
prior to the date entry is proposed, and (c) the natural gas 
company has given the owner notice of intent to enter as 
provided in subsection C. A natural gas company may use motor 
vehicles, self-propelled machinery, and power equipment on 
property only after receiving the permission of the landowner or 
his agent.15 
Landowner argued that V.C. § 56–49.01 “only applies to domestic public 
service companies because it is within Title 56 of the Code of Virginia,”16 
which governs Public Service Companies, and that Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
LLC, as a company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, was 
outside of this definition. Additionally, Landowner argued that the statute 
must be interpreted to avoid conflicting with Article IX, § 5 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.17 The circuit court held that Virginia Code § 56–
49.01 “turns upon a definition borrowed from [15 U.S.C. § 717a] rather 
than an implied definition suggested by its placement within the Code of 
Virginia” and that “[a] landowner has no constitutionally protected property 
right to exclude an authorized utility from entering his property for survey 
purposes.”18  
b) Ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia  
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted appeal, and affirmed the ruling 
of the circuit court. With regard to Landowner’s first argument, that V.C. § 
56–49.01 only applies to domestic natural gas companies because it is 
located within Title 56 of the Virginia Code, which governs Public Service 
Companies,19 the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that under Title 56, the 
definition of “corporation” and “company” includes “all corporations . . . 
doing business therein.”20 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia held 
that “both domestic corporations and foreign corporations that are “doing 
                                                                                                                 
 15. VA. CODE. ANN. § 56–49.01(A) (West 2017). 
 16. Palmer, 293 Va. at 577, 801 S.E.2d at 417. 
 17. Id. at 578.  
 18. Id. at 577, 801 S.E.2d at 416 (internal quotations omitted).  
 19. Id. at 578. 
 20. Id. (citation omitted).  
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business” within the Commonwealth—such as [Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
LLC]—are included in the definition of “corporation” for the purposes of 
Title 56.”21 
Regarding Landowner’s second argument, in which V.C. § 56–49.01 
impermissibly burdens a fundamental right, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
noted that with respect to the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, 
“[t]here is no stronger presumption known to the law than that which is 
made by the courts with respect to the constitutionality of an act of 
Legislature.”22 The Supreme Court of Virginia went further, citing both 
statutory and common law precedent dating back to 1782 allowing 
surveyors to enter private land for specified purposes without permission of 
the land owner.23  Landowner acknowledged this precedent, but asserted 
that the 2012 amendment to Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia 
vitiates these precedents.24 Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, as 
amended in 2012, states in relevant part: “a taking or damaging of private 
property is not for public use if the primary use is for private gain, private 
benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or 
economic development, except for the elimination of a public nuisance 
existing on the property.”25 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the 
2012 constitutional amendment “did not add any sticks to [Landowner’s] 
bundle of property rights that did not already exist,”26 and therefore held 
that her “fundamental property rights do not include the right to exclude 
[Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC] in the present case.”27 
 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 581, 801 S.E.3d at 418 (quoting Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 248, 53 
S.E. 401, 403 (1906)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 23. See Palmer, 293 Va. at 581-84, 801 S.E.3d at 418-20. 
 24. Id. at 583-84.  
 25. VA. CONST. ART. I, § 11. 
 26. Palmer, 293 Va. at 583, 801 S.E.3d at 418.  
 27. Id. at 584. 
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